Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

The National Intelligence Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

Copy No. 206

3.5(c)

WEDNESDAY JUNE 9, 1976 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 135

NR

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885 3.5(c)
TOP SECRET

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Argentina: Hard Line Pressed

Hard-line Argentine military officers are trying to force President Videla to take a tougher stand on subversion and a variety of other issues. This could confront Videla with serious human rights problems and divisions within the military.

Videla and advisers who share his moderate and methodical approach toward national reform are trying to curb the arbitrary arrests by police and armed forces security services, compile a list of those detained, and halt vigilante-style activities against suspected and known leftists by semiofficial death squads.

Some of Videla's subordinates also are attempting to work with Peronist labor and political leaders in the hope of eventually building a base of popular support for the military government. To accomplish this they reportedly believe that government economic policies will have to become more "populist" in orientation and provide for a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Hard-liners opposed to these and other government proposals—ranging from ambassadorial appointments to revising foreign investment laws—include a number of high-ranking army officers who have a sympathetic junta member in Admiral Emilio Massera.

Massera and his army colleagues do not appear bent on ousting Videla as President, but rather are determined to force moderates out of the President's circle of advisers. Only then, they apparently reason, can the government impose discipline on the labor force, destroy the influence of corrupt and irresponsible politicians, and eliminate the well-entrenched leftists.

The junta's image is already suffering from its inability to control right-wing terrorism. Moreover, labor and political leaders are increasingly concerned about Videla's inability to enforce the moderate line he promised on taking office

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

Page Denied

stic

idge, May 9

res (25 acres) of land around the lf-kilometer (0.3 mile) bridge and its pproaches have been cleared to deter errilla attacks.

The Beitbridge rail line has carried ore than 70 percent of Rhodesia's reign trade since the Mozambican overnment closed its border with hodesia in March.

The other rail line to South Africa asses through Botswana and can handle nly about a quarter of Rhodesia's trade. necessary, Rhodesia could manage ithout the Botswana line, but prolonged terdiction of the Beitbridge route would eriously hamper trade and threaten hodesia's economy.

The Rhodesians also believe their perations across the border into Mozamique are causing the insurgents roblems. In these operations, Rhodesian regulars, including former Portuguese oldiers from Angola and Mozambique, nd ex-insurgents, are said to have killed a ignificant number of guerrillas.

Some senior South African officials eportedly believe that the Rhodesian osition is worsening. South African rime Minister Vorster last week reaffirmed his government's decision not to ntervene militarily in Rhodesia even if inocent civilians should be killed there. TS RUFF NF/OC)

plan specifies that a minimum of 51 tons of binary nerve agent (a mixture of two or more non-toxic chemicals to form a toxic agent) 50 tons of mustard gas and 23.5 tons of tear gas are necessary for an acceptable defensive capability.

While the Nationalists have sufficient qualified scientists and technicians to staff their chemical warfare program, they are dependent on foreign technology and assistance to keep it going. They have purchased chemical warfare technology from Israel and West Germany and are now seeking to expand foreign contacts and working relationships with the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden.

The Nationalist government concluded an agreement with Israel in 1971, after being unable to purchase $2 million worth of chemical warfare equipment from the US. The agreement called for the construction of a chemical laboratory to conduct research and to produce chemical agents and protective equipment. For the past five years, the chemical research and development program has been under the guidance of Israeli scientists.

Development of the binary nerve agent GB is complete, and pilot quantities are being produced. Israel is assisting in building facilities on Taiwan for producing the components of the binary agent and probably helped build a mustard production facility that opened in 1974. plan calls for multiple rocket launchers as the primary delivery system. Premier Chiang Ching-kuo has called for a July deadline for the development of a prototype and wants the launchers ready for use in June 1977. Other possible delivery systems include the 4.2 inch mortar, the 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer, and the 8 inch gun. It is also possible the Nationalists might develop some sort of air-delivery system using either fighter bombers or transports as platforms.

Significant problems have arisen in mating the binary agent to a warhead. A reliable method of mixing the chemicals has not been found, and a major aerodynamic stability problem has been encountered. To date there have been three test firings of the 4.5 inch rocket, and results are said to have been "less than satisfactory."

It is apparent that the development of the Nationalists' chemical warfare capability hinges on solving these problems.

If production quotas and dates are met, the Nationalists will have a substantial inventory of chemical munitions by 1980. It probably will take another five years, however, to produce the quantities of chemical agents and weapons that the government believes are necessary to repel an invasion of Taiwan.

Significant steps to upgrade its defen- requested further procurements on an urgent basis.

Peking's Priorities

Mainland China, on the other hand, apparently has given chemical warfare a lower priority. Chemical warfare probably will play only a minor role in any of its military plans for the next five years. China is judged not to have a sophisticated overall chemical warfare program but does have the knowledge and capability to upgrade its present program if it should so decide.

China probably does have a small stockpile of World War I-type chemical agents and agent-filled munitions, but we have no evidence to indicate that the stockpile includes any of the modern nerve agents.

We do not think Peking has the capability to produce nerve agents, and it probably would take some five years before China could build production facilities and supply chemical agents to its military forces.

China's military forces receive rudimentary training in chemical warfare defense. They lack the equipment, however, to provide them with more than a limited capability to protect against, or recover from, a chemical attack. Again, it would take at least five years for the mainland Chinese significantly to upgrade their protective capabilities. (S NF/OC)

Mauritania

Polisario Attack

A brief terrorist attack yesterday in Nouakchott, Mauritania, was apparently carried out by Polisario Front guerrillas opposed to the Moroccan-Mauritanian partition of Western Sahara. It was the first such incident in the city.

Polisario forces in recent weeks have increased their activity within Mauritania and probably will attempt further operations in the capital. Although Mauritanian officials are likely to increase security measures in and around the city, they will be hard put to forestall such attacks because of the city's vulnerability.

Nouakchott is on a flat plain extending into the desert. Buildings within the presidential compound, in particular, are easily targeted from outside; they are among the tallest in the city.

Mauritanian public reaction to the guerrilla attacks is likely to be expressed in a show of renewed support for the government's policy of partition of Western Sahara. President Ould Daddah has wide support in the government and with the general public. Any attempt by Polisario guerrillas to use terrorism to try to undermine the President is likely to backfire. (C)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885

Page Denied

European Communists

Preparatory Meeting

The editorial commission seeking to complete preparations for the proposed European communist party conference convenes today in East Berlin for a two-day meeting. The Soviet delegation is led by Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev. The second-ranking Soviet delegate, party secretary Katushev, visited both Romania and Yugoslavia during the past two weeks in an apparent effort to iron out differences that have prevented scheduling the conference.

The meeting in East Berlin has been billed by participants as the "final" negotiating session, but that assertion may not hold true. In addition to Soviet efforts with the independent-minded parties, those parties have been engaged in a last-minute flurry of consultations among themselves. The latest such talks, concluded only yesterday, were held in Rome between Italian Communist leader Berlinguer and Stane Dolanc, the number-two man in the Yugoslav party. (C) -*CIA, DIA, NSA*-

et Visits

of the wishes of a minority.

Averoff's performance is a reflection of Prime Minister Caramanlis' shift to partisan politics in the face of challenges to his leadership from the left. Caramanlis reportedly was furious over leftist demonstrations on Rhodes and Mykonos last month to prevent port visits by US ships, and noted that tensions with Turkey make it imperative that the Sixth Fleet remain in the Aegean.

Greek security police clashed with demonstrators on both Rhodes and Mykonos; the government eventually asked that the ships leave to avoid more serious violence. In the meantime, a limited schedule of port visits has been resumed, including one, to a port near Athens last week, that was carried out without incident. (S NF/OC)

Photography

o support 9 to 11 infantry battalions—a eduction of three or four batallions since May 20. Under the Sinai II agreement, gypt is not allowed to have more than ight infantry battalions in the zone.

The Israelis did not appear to have any excess equipment in their part of the zone.

In the Egyptian portion of the Sinai we can identify with confidence equipment for two mechanized and seven motorized infantry battalions. In addition, there is enough equipment for possibly two other motorized battalions, but this equipment is dispersed, and we cannot firmly identify the units.

Since May 20 the Egyptians have constructed, but not occupied, three more SA-6 sites in their limited-armaments zone and refurbished another older site that had deteriorated. The three new positions bring to 11 the number of SA-6 sites constructed since Sinai II went into effect in late February.

Although the Sinai I agreement prohibited the construction of surface-to-air missile sites in the Egyptian and Israeli limited zones, the current Sinai II agreement bars only surface-to-air missiles from the zones. (S NF SENSITIVE)

Warsaw Pact. Because Moscow is mindful of Jordan's close ties to the US, it probably will be reluctant to supply these weapons despite its eagerness to score a political victory.

The Soviets reportedly told the Jordanians last month that they would not supply sensitive weapons, and that the Syrians would be considered the "custodians" and provide maintenance in Jordan for weapons that are provided.

For its part, Amman reportedly insisted that Jordan have "complete control" over any air defense system installed in Jordan, and that no Soviet advisers be permitted in Jordan.

The two sides accepted these conditions, apparently with the understanding that Syrian officers would be allowed to enter Jordan to maintain the Soviet equipment, and that Jordanian officers willing to announce an agreement while Husayn is in Moscow.

Despite his determination to push ahead with his negotiations with Moscow, Husayn has left the way clear for the Saudis to reconsider their position and offer to provide full funding for a US Hawk system. The King last week sent a letter offering to meet personally with Saudi King Khalid, hoping that such a meeting would provide Riyadh an opportunity gracefully to reverse itself.

The Saudis have not replied directly to Husayn's letter. Crown Prince Fahd yesterday sent word through the Jordanian embassy in Jidda, however, that the Saudis had "learned of a British offer concerning air defense"—presumably that involving a joint US-British system—and hoped that it would be acceptable to Jordan. (TSU NF/OC)

Egypt now has enough equipment there

Memo. . .

From Page 1

on the other.

- Reprisals by Lebanese leftists and Palestinians for perceived American support of Syria.
- The withdrawal of protection by Fatah and Lebanese Arab Army elements providing security (such as the military unit guarding the US embassy) against local gangs.

The most serious threat is likely to be the activities of armed lawless elements until now kept in check by Fatah and the Lebanese Arab Army. During the breakup of the Lebanese army in April and prior to the arrival of Lebanese Arab Army forces, these elements extracted protection money from foreigners in Ras Beirut. Such demands could easily escalate into kidnapings, armed robberies, and possibly killings.

Because of our association with the Syrians in the eyes of Lebanese leftists and Palestinians, Americans could also be the target of reprisals. The extent of this danger will in large part depend on whether and how quickly the Syrians move to take West Beirut and how strongly the leftists oppose. (C)

Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
Exemption category 5B (1,2,3&4)
Declassification date impossible to determine

[redacted]

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The *National Intelligence Daily* is prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the other US foreign intelligence organizations. Late items prepared by CIA alone are so marked. Analytical feature articles are attributed to their authors.

CI NID 76-135JX

Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINTChannels

Security and control abbreviations used in this publication:

TSU—Top Secret UMBRA
SS—Secret SPOKE
S—Secret
C—Confidential
U—Unclassified
NOFORN—Not Releasable to (NF) Foreign Nationals
ORCON—Dissemination and Extraction of Information (OC) Controlled by Originator
REL . . .—This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02997885